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3IMPROVING INCENTIVES FOR COMPLIANCE WITH 
NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES
Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, Dean Rusk Center, University of Georgia
Thus by every device, from the stick to the carrot, the emaciated ...donkey is made to pull the... 
barrow up an ever steepening hill. -- Winston Churchill, 1938, on the eve of World War II
The carrot is we won't use the stick.  --  Gen. Colin Powell, 1990, on the eve of the air war against Iraq
INTRODUCTION
While much attention has been paid in academic and policy circles to the
efficacy of sanctions and other forms of economic coercion for conditioning the
behavior of target states,1 much less attention has been paid to the use of
incentives to foster bilateral cooperation.2   Sanctions seek to impede the target
state's welfare and thus produce the desired change in behavior;  yet sanctions
carry costs for the sending state as well.  Sanctions may interrupt trade and
financial contacts of business firms in the sending state and public support for
sanctions may wane over time.   In other words, absent tight control on the
market by the sending state, sanctions are a lose-lose instrument with costs to
both parties.  In comparison, incentives offer new or additional gains for a
change in behavior.  Compared with sanctions, incentives offer a win-win
approach, particularly when the sending state gains both politically and
economically from expanded trade and other forms of linkage with the recipient
state.
In an initial attempt to redress the relative lack of attention paid to
incentives, Long has developed a theory of how economic incentives alter a
state's external payoff environment and affect its internal preferences and
choices.3  Incentives shape both interstate strategic interaction and domestic
politics.  The sending state may anticipate gains both politically and economically
from the use of incentives, e.g., increased trade opportunities.  Incentives also
work differently than sanctions within the recipient state.  Sanctions create a
"rally-round-the-flag"  effect in view of the harm posed to the target state, which
can provide an opportunity for leaders to appeal for popular support
accompanied by suppression of dissent.  Sanctions also act to drive the target
state in search of alternative suppliers, potentially undermining the impact of
sanctions. Because incentives (when skillfully used) do not threaten the recipient
state, they do not challenge its sovereignty or threaten to reduce its welfare.
Indeed incentives can create a base of support within the recipient state as
technology transfer and other forms of incentives begin to improve the position
of domestic elites.  Also incentives permit the recipient a greater degree of
freedom to react cooperatively without fear of economic loss or impairment of
reputation.
Traditionally, non-proliferation measures have covered a relatively narrow
band of policy options: export controls, arms control, and redressing security
4concerns.4  Yet practice over the last 20 years has seen an increasing emphasis on
addressing underlying causes of insecurity, the "demand" side of proliferation, as
a more satisfactory way to address proliferation problems.5   Transparency
measures, confidence- and security-building measures, conventional arms control,
and security assurances have come to play a more prominent role in attacking
proliferation problems.  Technology development and targeted assistance also
have been used as alternatives to steer states away from the pursuit of nuclear
programs as a pathway to technological advancement.
The incentives Long evaluates center around the provision of advanced
technology to Sweden, the People's Republic of China, and Czechoslovakia.
While technology transfer may represent the majority of incentive packages
offered,  provision of expert advice and access to international capital may
present other attractive alternatives for modifying behavior.  For the purposes of
this presentation, using Long's approach I will examine incentive packages
offered to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and
Ukraine to foster compliance with non-proliferation regimes.  These two case
studies are much more recent than Long's subjects; consequently it may be too
early to tell what the extent of long-term compliance will be in the future.  On the
other hand these two case studies provide some insight into the mechanics of
creating the ground work for a long-term incentive structure which sets out to
achieve not simply harmonization but true cooperation in the achievement of
policy goals.
              
THE CASE OF NORTH KOREA
Although North Korea acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
in 1985,6 suspicions about the nature of its nuclear energy program emerged in
early 1993 when it refused an IAEA request for routine inspections at two sites
at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.7  The IAEA's inspection request arose from
questions about the accuracy of North Korea's declarations regarding the amount
of plutonium it had separated over the years. IAEA inspections during 1992
concluded that North Korea had produced more material than it had declared.
On the basis of intelligence information supplied by the United States, the IAEA
suggested the two suspect sites might contain waste products from undeclared
plutonium separation. North Korea opposed the inspections because it
interpreted the safeguards agreement to prohibit the IAEA from using
information coming from third parties. It declared the two facilities to be military
sites having nothing to do with nuclear activities and outside the ambit of the
safeguards inspection agreement.  The IAEA countered with a request for a
special inspection, the first one ever requested in IAEA's history.8  Although the
agreement did not address limiting special inspections to declared nuclear
facilities only, the terms specifically granted the right to a special inspection if the
IAEA believed North Korea had provided inadequate information.9
Despite efforts to resolve the impasse via discussions between North
Korea and the IAEA, on March 12 the North Korean foreign minister notified
the president of the U.N. Security Council of his country's intention to withdraw
from the NPT.10 Its intent to withdraw prompted U.S. officials to discuss with
5other governments methods to encourage North Korea to reconsider its
decision, a process hampered by the absence of direct diplomatic relations
between the United States and North Korea.11  The strongest reaction of all was
the IAEA board vote, finding North Korea in non-compliance with its
obligations under the safeguards agreement.12
In addition to its opposition to special inspections, North Korea had
other complaints.  Few of the improved political and economic contacts
promised  by the United States and other countries had materialized in the wake
of North Korea's signature of the IAEA inspection agreement.  No significant
outside investments had materialized nor had there been any change in its
diplomatic status with the United States or Japan. It may have seen its nuclear
ambitions -- its best and only bargaining chip -- being eroded without gaining
anything tangible in return.13
The international community was restrained in its response, calling for a
series of international consultations to develop ways to change North Korea's
decision to exercise its right of withdrawal.  The UN Security Council,
reaffirming the importance of the NPT and the parties adherence to it, in
Resolution 825 urged North Korea to reconsider its withdrawal decision.14 The
United States left open the door for continuing a series of higher-level diplomatic
contacts begun in 1992 between U.S. and North Korean officials. With its allies,
particularly Japan, the United States formulated statements of incentives that
might persuade North Korea to abandon its withdrawal plans.15  Possible
incentives to be offered by the United States to ease the crisis included
permanent cancellation of Team Spirit, international inspections of U.S. military
bases in South Korea to confirm the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, and a policy
of "no blame" similar to the international approach to South Africa's
renunciation of its clandestine nuclear weapons program.
 China's influence in producing this restrained response should not be
underestimated.  It favored direct and quiet diplomacy over direct pressure; its
veto in the Security Council provided it with a great deal of leverage to moderate
any contemplated Security Council actions, including proposals for blockades or
even military strikes against nuclear facilities in the North.16  By virtue of its
strong political and trade relationship with North Korea as well as its stake in
ensuring no new nuclear powers would emerge on its borders, China had a
pivotal role to play by cooperating with the other actors.17  China could indicate
its willingness to help guarantee North Korea's security and to reassure North
Korea that, if it did give up nuclear weapons research, the benefits would
outweigh the disadvantages.18  Similarly South Korea had begun a very promising
dialogue with North Korea, which already had produced a treaty of non-
aggression and held prospects for a North-South bilateral nuclear agreement even
more restrictive than those negotiated under the NPT and IAEA.  The future of
Korean unification talks and South Korea's transition to civilian democracy were
at risk.  They, too, had much to lose.19       
The need for uniform application of principles of compliance conflicted
with the need to tailor responses to the region.  For this crisis did not affect
North Korea alone.  The first positive steps to create multilateral security
6agreements in Northeast Asia would halt.  Continuing uncertainty surrounding
North Korea would complicate Japan's decisionmaking about its security role in
Asia.20 At the international level, an overly confrontational handling of this crisis
could undermine prospects for positive outcomes at the NPT renewal conference
set for 1995. 21
As the 90-day waiting period ticked away, the United States and North
Korea met during five rounds of talks in early June, led by Assistant Secretary of
State Robert Gallucci and North Korea's First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Kang Sok Ju.  The day before the effective date of NPT withdrawal, the two
parties released an unprecedented joint statement in which North Korea decided
unilaterally to suspend the withdrawal process "as long as it considers necessary"
while the parties continued their dialogue toward developing a fundamental
solution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula. The parties expressed
their support for the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula as well as the peaceful reunification of Korea.  Additionally,
the parties provided assurances against the threat and use of force (including
nuclear weapons), pledged mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and
promised non-interference in each other's internal affairs.  Although routine
IAEA inspections would resume (as both parties expressed their support for the
impartial application of full-scope IAEA safeguards), North Korea did not agree
to accept special inspections at the two suspect sites.  Other issues which
remained open for discussion were the continuation of Team Spirit exercises and
North Korean inspections of U.S. bases in the South.22
In parallel with the direct U.S.-North Korea talks, discussions with the
IAEA on safeguards implementation resumed over the summer.  Intransigent
North Korean officials allowed IAEA inspectors to perform only maintenance
on monitoring equipment.  IAEA officials grew increasingly frustrated,
culminating in a 72-2 vote by the IAEA board of governors which sanctioned
North Korea for its failure to discharge its safeguards obligations.23 Declaring the
IAEA to no longer be impartial, North Korea broke off all talks with the agency,
preferring to rely on direct bilateral talks with the United States to resolve
outstanding issues.24 While the direct talks provided some easing of the North
Korean position to allow IAEA inspectors to resume visits to declared nuclear
sites, the special inspection targets remained off the list and North Korea
continued to drag its feet in certifying that resumption of the inspections were
more than a one-time deal. 25
The impasse was broken temporarily by a U.S.-South Korea agreement
to call off "Team Spirit" military training exercises planned for 1994.  Direct
North-South negotiations over improving relations resumed as well.
Nevertheless, the North's refusal to allow full-scale IAEA inspections and its
interference with inspections at declared sites led the United States to cancel
high-level talks, to resume planning for Team Spirit, and to pursue the highly
symbolic gesture of deploying Patriot air defense missiles to South Korea.26
Additionally, while the Security Council refused to issue a formal resolution
condemning North Korea's failure to comply with its inspection obligations, the
Council did issue a statement indicating it remained seized of the matter and that
7in the future it could give the matter further consideration to achieve full
implementation of the IAEA-North Korea agreement, presumably including the
need for special inspections.  The statement also called for Hans Blix, IAEA
director, to present a progress report to the Council in six weeks, essentially
providing the North Koreans with a deadline for compliance.27 
The nuclear minuet continued as North Korea began refueling its small
power reactor without IAEA inspectors present, although IAEA observations
indicated the process was being carried out under a safeguards procedure in their
absence.28  However the situation deteriorated further when the IAEA announced
that the refueling procedure had compromised its ability to determine if nuclear
material had been diverted in the past.  The IAEA withdrew its technical
assistance and North Korea in turn withdrew from the IAEA.  In response the
United States introduced a draft sanctions resolution to the Security Council.29
The stalemate was broken by direct talks between former President Jimmy
Carter and North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in mid-June.  In exchange for a
verified freeze of the North's nuclear program, the Clinton administration was
given the opportunity to resume high-level talks which had been adjourned for
nearly a year.  By August, U.S. and North Korean officials had constructed a
three-stage process, expected to unfold over a decade, which would normalize
diplomatic and economic relations and provide assistance with the construction
of proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors in exchange for the elimination of
North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The first step in the process would be
a continuation of North Korea's freeze on its nuclear program, maintenance of
IAEA safeguards, and its continuing membership in the NPT. For its part the
United States pledged to provide alternative energy sources for civilian
purposes.30 The second phase would be marked by U.S. assurances on
construction of the reactors in exchange for a permanent freeze, closure of one
operating reactor coupled with a construction halt on two others, the sealing of
North Korea's plutonium reprocessing facility, and a pledge to forego in-country
reprocessing of all spent fuel.  Although more sketchily detailed, the third stage
would encompass the dismantling of the reprocessing facility as well as
acceptance of special inspections in advance of the commencement of
construction of the light-water reactors.31  Following a series of technical talks,
more detailed implementation steps emerged, including another Security Council
statement officially requesting the IAEA to become involved in monitoring the
freeze proposed by the bilateral framework.32
To assist in implementing the agreement through financial burden-
sharing, Japan, South Korea and the United States set up the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO).  By mid-August over 30 countries
had agreed to join the consortium, contributing money, oil, and/or technical
services.  While North Korea balked initially at South Korea being the prime
supplier for the two reactors, skillful drafting of a joint statement eased the
problem by referring to the United States as the "principal point of contact" and
"program coordinator" in deference to Pyongyang's sensitivities regarding the
South's relative economic and technological superiority.  By early 1996, these
issues had been resolved, at least for the time being, and construction equipment
8from the South began its way to the North.  North Korea is expected to repay
the $4-4.5 billion loan interest-free over a 20-year period.
Could this near-disaster have been avoided?  North Korea had agreed to
allow IAEA inspections, yet Washington and South Korea failed to carry out
their ends of the bargain.  North Korea had not been allowed to conduct
inspections of South Korean bases to verify the removal of U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons.  South Korea demanded in its direct talks with North Korea the right
to conduct short-notice challenge inspections at any nuclear-related site in the
North.  Adding insult to injury, the IAEA aimed its first special inspection
demand ever made at North Korea only shortly after it joined the NPT.  The
resumption of planning Team Spirit was seen as an act of bad faith.  None of the
promised incentives for joining the NPT had been delivered to North Korea to
its satisfaction.33
Imposing punitive sanctions on the world's most isolated and insulated
regime was bound to fail and would only exacerbate the paranoia of its ruling
elite.  A military option not only ran the risk of failing to find and destroy
clandestine nuclear material but also to contaminate the Korean Peninsula with
radioactive material, if not triggering an all-out war.  The military option also
would put the U.S.-China relationship at risk as well as destroy the global
consensus regarding North Korea's obligations under the NPT.34 The lesson
from the North Korea case is that promises have to be kept and that there is no
quick-fix option; only patient diplomacy to establish the relationship and
implementation in the form of explicit, staged bargains will suffice.35 
   
THE CASE OF UKRAINE
With the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine found itself with extensive
and diverse nuclear-related capabilities, not only in numbers of warheads and
delivery vehicles but also in terms of nuclear power and nuclear research reactors,
uranium mining and milling plants, facilities producing heavy water and dual-use
metals such as hafnium and zirconium, as well as sophisticated chemical plants
capable of producing materials used in the uranium enrichment process.36
Although the Soviet Union had been a party to the NPT, Russia "inherited"
nearly all the existing nuclear export control structure and available trained
personnel.  Ukraine had no experience with creating and implementing an export
control regime for dual-use items.  It was a member of neither the NPT nor the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.  Domestically Ukraine faced political fragmentation,
acute energy shortages, an economy in free-fall, and pressures for autonomy for
various ethnic groups.37 A combination of decentralized authority, porous
borders, underdeveloped export control structures, and a government primarily
focused on the economy rather than proliferation led to a struggle over several
years between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States to bring Ukraine into the
NPT fold.
Despite multilateral efforts mounted to address proliferation problems in
the Soviet successor states, the United States had lost some credibility and
leverage in these negotiations because of its slowness in expending so-called
"Nunn-Lugar" funds designed to reward restraint in the areas of nuclear exports
9and non-proliferation.  By early 1993 less than 2 percent of $800 million allocated
had been authorized for expenditure.38  Indeed it was taking up to an entire year
from the time a bilateral agreement was signed to the date a contract was
awarded;  four different Congressional committees had to approve
reprogramming of funds from the Pentagon budget to the Nunn-Lugar fund
budget.39
Compounding the problem was the failure of Ukraine to ratify START I
and to accede to the NPT.  The Bush Administration was willing to reiterate to
Ukraine those security assurances incorporated in the NPT and the Helsinki Final
Act of the CSCE as well as offering $175 million in Nunn-Lugar funds.  Ukraine
reportedly wanted $2.8 billion for dismantling the nuclear weapons remaining
there.40  The distance between these bargaining points was exacerbated by
Ukraine's desire to include guarantees against economic coercion (particularly
with respect to Russia's potential ability to cut off its energy supplies and Russia's
demand that Ukraine pay market prices for oil and natural gas) as well as by
Russia's requirement that Ukraine ratify START I and accede to the NPT as a
condition for receiving security guarantees from Russia.  Also Ukraine wanted to
receive a portion of the proceeds of Russia's sale to the United States of highly
enriched uranium (HEU) derived from dismantled weapons, a share projected to
be 15 to 20 percent of the total proceeds.41
Ratification delays and wrangling with Russia over the operability of the
nuclear forces remaining on Ukrainian territory raised doubts about the sincerity
of Ukraine's commitment to become a non-nuclear state.  U.S. negotiators
suspected Ukraine simply was trying to bid up the price for its compliance using
its extensive nuclear infrastructure as bargaining chips, among the very few chips
at its disposal for leverage with the West and Moscow.42  Not surprisingly, the
more the West and Russia ignored Ukraine while continuing to focus on nuclear
disarmament, the larger the pro-nuclear lobby in Ukraine grew.43  Some in the
lobby saw nuclear weapons as a way to ensure that Ukraine could remain
primarily responsible for its security.  Others saw de-nuclearization as a
bargaining chip to be traded for security assurances.  
Nuclear bargaining chips were sure to serve Ukraine's pursuit of gaining
attention, money, and security guarantees. On the other hand, playing the nuclear
card garnered more negative than favorable attention.  It also could not increase
significantly the amount of money available through Nunn-Lugar funds;  those
amounts were controlled far more closely by the American budgetary process and
deficit crisis than pressures exerted by Ukraine.  While Ukraine might gain some
financial compensation for nuclear weapons removed from its soil and HEU
sales, the amount of money it could expect to receive over the 20-year lifespan
of the sales agreement represented only a small fraction of its expected
comparable gross domestic product.44  And the security guarantees it sought were
already in place and need not have been bargained for at all.  
To break the impasse, the Clinton administration sought to broaden the
scope of U.S.-Ukrainian dialogue beyond nuclear issues.  It had become apparent
that the United States needed to play the role of facilitator to assist in resolving
a host of complex issues between Russia and Ukraine.45 It also may have become
10
apparent to some in Ukraine that nuclear weapons presented a hollow threat and
a wasting asset, in the sense that nuclear weapons increasingly were losing their
legitimacy as a source of security and as a usable military force.  Unless it was
willing to join the ranks of the pariah states, Ukraine faced a fading opportunity
for engagement with the West.46
To nudge Ukraine off its set point, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
proposed the establishment of a bilateral working group to provide advice on
dismantlement and internationally monitored storage of Ukraine's nuclear
materials as well as other working groups to discuss military doctrine and civilian
and military exchanges  He also indicated that Washington was prepared to
mediate security disputes between Ukraine and Russia.47  When disarray within
the Ukrainian parliament (Rada) yielded no movement by November 1993, the
Department of Defense modified its policy toward Ukraine to release a modest
amount of Nunn-Lugar funds for dismantling weapons prior to START I
ratification and NPT accession by Ukraine.48
Months dragged by with Ukraine growing more isolated, facing economic
and energy crises, and challenged by separatist groups.  In November 1993 when
the Rada ratified START I, it did so with 13 reservations. These reservations
reiterated Ukraine's ownership and administrative control over the nuclear
weapons on its territory, releasing only 36 percent of the launchers and 42
percent of the nuclear warheads for elimination.  In effect this reservation would
leave Ukraine as the world's third largest nuclear power at the end of the seven-
year START I implementation period.  Before it would accede to the transfer of
even this limited number of weapons, Ukraine demanded the right to monitor the
dismantling process, to receive compensation for eliminated fissile material, and
to receive international financial and technical assistance for its efforts.  The Rada
demanded a variety of security assurances from the nuclear powers: foreclosing
the use of either nuclear or conventional forces against Ukraine, guaranteeing the
inviolability of its borders, and forbidding the use of economic sanctions against
Ukraine.  The Rada also expressly rejected Article V of the Lisbon Protocol
(covering the successor states' accession to the NPT) which would require
Ukraine to become a non-nuclear state in the shortest possible time.49  Clearly the
Rada was set to hold onto the nuclear card as long as possible even if it meant
undercutting the fundamental purpose of the NPT.
Fortunately, creative diplomacy prevailed at the Moscow trilateral summit
in January 1994.  Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin and Kravchuk couched their deal as
an executive action, i.e., as a political statement rather than as a formal agreement
requiring legislative approval.  In exchange for Ukraine acceding to the NPT and
agreeing to ratify START I, the United States and Russia would offer Ukraine the
"positive" and "negative" security assurances contained in the NPT as well as
security assurances and guarantees of border inviolability contained in the
Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE.  Additionally Russia and the United States
reaffirmed their commitment to refrain from economic coercion against Ukraine.
For the United States part, the statement committed it to expand Nunn-Lugar
funding as well as to provide other financial assistance to Ukraine. 
The details of two side agreements to the trilateral statement were to
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remain secret due to political sensitivities in Ukraine and Russia.  Ukraine
reportedly agreed that 1,800 strategic warheads on its soil would be withdrawn
to Russia within three years and that in turn Russia would agree to write off some
of Kiev's past oil and gas debts as compensation for the tactical warheads already
removed in 1992.  Some of this compensation was to be delivered up-front to
provide Kravchuk with a tangible accomplishment directly addressing Ukraine's
dire economic straits.  Additionally Russia agreed to supply nuclear fuel elements
for Ukraine's civilian reactors in exchange for HEU removed from tactical
warheads.50  The United States agreed to reimburse Russia for the costs of
warhead dismantling and fuel-rod fabrication while serving as an honest broker
for the valuation of the bilateral transactions.51 
Shortly thereafter, the Rada passed a two-part resolution calling on
President Kravchuk to exchange the instruments of ratification for START I and
accepting Ukraine's obligation to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear state.  In
the wake of the trilateral agreement, other countries began to come forward with
offers of dismantlement assistance and other forms of financial aid.  Nunn-Lugar
funding increased as well.52  Even with a change in the Ukrainian presidency
(Leonid Kuchma succeeded Leonid Kravchuk in the summer of 1994) and
apparent conflict between the Rada and the executive branch, Ukraine's
commitment to the trilateral agreement remained steadfast.  According to
Sherman Garnett, Ukraine finally may have realized it had gotten "quite clearly
the best deal Ukraine was likely to get."53
INCENTIVES
Beyond the incentives found in the two cases described here, a perusal of
reported nuclear-related trade and cooperation agreements reveals a host of
economic and other types of incentives that are being used by a broad range of
states in their post-Cold War non-proliferation diplomacy.54  Financial assistance
in its traditional forms, market access agreements, and access to capital from
private investors and international institutions increasingly are being made
conditional on the recipient's adherence to arms control regimes.55  Japan, having
increased its development assistance enormously, now slightly outspends the
United States; Japan aid in 1995 accounted for 15-20 percent of the entire
government budget of almost every East Asian country.56  Clearly these two
nations can have a great deal of impact by conditioning foreign aid on non-
proliferation.      
In addition to financial assistance and loans, non-monetary incentives
abound: bilateral inspection agreements; joint nuclear accounting and control
systems; exchanges of lists of nuclear sites as a confidence-building measure; hot-
line agreements; provision of nuclear safety training; research exchanges;
mediation and facilitation services (similar to the role played by the United States
as honest broker in Ukraine-Russian arrangements); technical advice exchanged
for oil supplies; provision of reactor management and safety monitoring
equipment; leasing of power plant simulators for training purposes; collaboration
of civilian uses of radioisotopes in agriculture, medicine, and industry;  creation
of regional nuclear safety organizations;  construction of radiation-waste
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processing plants; accident mitigation training; dismantlement assistance; and
even relief from U.S. antidumping procedures as they affect the uranium-
exporting CIS republics.  States offering incentives range from the United States,
Japan, and Canada all the way to the Marshall Islands.57  
There also may be a role for sending states in educating recipients about
what make better objectives to seek in a bargain.  Ukraine would have been better
off to have asked for security assistance (not mere assurances), improvement in
defenses, extensive programs of military-to-military contacts, help in exploiting
transparency measures under CFE and CSCE, and introduction of preventive
deployment forces along the Ukraine-Russia border to address security concerns
and as a confidence-building measure.   Also, to more directly address its energy
needs, Ukraine could have asked to be integrated into the West European
electricity grid to reduce its vulnerability to Russian impairment of its energy
supplies.58
While economic aid and technology transfers still comprise the bulk of
incentive packages, non-economic incentives also have a role to play.  Examples
of non-economic incentives include establishing liaison offices and diplomatic
contacts (as was done in the case of North Korea); cultural exchanges; bilateral
visits or summit meetings of leaders; or even mediated talks similar to the Camp
David process. It is worth reiterating that the use of non-economic incentives
creates a place for both wealthier and poorer nations to become involved with
the process and can spread the burden across a wider array of states than is
possible when relying on financial resources alone.
 
SUMMARY
  M.Y. Park uses the analogy of "luring" to describe how incentives should
be used.59  A lure is a practical, functional tool, not an ideological concept. States
can employ lures so that the sending state is viewed neither as an enemy nor as
an appeaser but as a problem-solver.  In Park's view, lures primarily are economic
tools, particularly useful in conditioning the behavior of nations like North Korea
and Ukraine which have serious economic problems.  If they want to sell nuclear
technology, it is more likely that it is because they need the money, rather than
them desiring to support rogue ideologies.
This is not to imply that incentives are perfect.  Incentives provided to
one state may complicate relations with other potential recipients, who would like
to receive the same consideration, and with other donors, who would like to
mastermind similar deals within their ambit of influence.  For example, the
arrangement created for North Korea drew complaints from Ukraine and Belarus
when they were not offered similar favorable packages.  When Russia and China
were criticized strongly by the United States for their proposals to provide Iran
with nuclear power reactors, both pointed to the North Korea reactor deal as an
appropriate precedent for their actions.60  Incentives cannot provide a quick fix,
but instead require a long-term commitment by the sending state to work on the
relationship.  Incentives cannot foreclose the recipient from making decisions
independent of this relationship.  Incentives also require at least a modicum of
institutional strength and stability in the recipient state.61  Even with these
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caveats, incentives worked in these two cases.    
In the North Korean situation the United States had a large array of low-
cost or no-cost incentives to offer:  normalization of diplomatic and economic
relations, assistance in normalizing relations between the North and South, and
termination of joint exercises.  The only significant incentives in cost terms were
offers of technical and/or economic assistance to facilitate the replacement of
existing graphite reactors with light-water reactors using low-enriched uranium
produced outside North Korea.  These costs, while not trivial, pale by
comparison with costs of military engagement. 62  
The key to the management of the North Korean crisis lay in the
realization that proliferation involves much more than the military utility of
acquisition of nuclear materials.  The quest for nuclear materials has political,
economic, and social aspects which must be addressed synchronously.  Indeed
it may be more fruitful in the long run to address these issues first, to create a
web of relationships and confidence-building measures designed to improve the
security environment so that eventually North Korea will develop the political
will to accept the strictures imposed by the NPT regime. 63  As Jonathan Pollack
phrased it,  "The challenge for the United States will be to develop alliance
strategies that enable credible, longer-term engagement and interaction with the
region's principal powers, but that no longer presuppose an overt military threat
to core U.S. national interests as a central organizing rationale for an alliance."64
In the case of Ukraine, the United States pursued creative diplomacy in
an attempt to press Ukraine to move beyond its reliance on nuclear bargaining
chips.  At the same time as the Rada was attaching its laundry list of reservations
to  START I ratification and stalling on the approval of implementing agreements
for Nunn-Lugar funds, the United States, Canada, and Sweden stayed focused on
the long term and reached a four-way agreement with Ukraine to improve the
safety of its civilian nuclear power reactors and to set up a technology and science
center to provide alternative employment for weapons scientists.65  Perhaps these
Western states detected Ukraine's resentment of being left out of negotiations
which had focused so closely on Russia's needs. These multi-party agreements
not only provided immediate monetary benefits but also indicated a willingness
by Western powers to focus more widely on the successor states, i.e., to court
this "nuclear wallflower."  It was in the best interests of the United States as well
to induce Ukraine to make formal commitments to the NPT and START I as
soon as possible so that any successor administration there would find it difficult
to repudiate binding international obligations.66  
While there is little data yet from the North Korea case to indicate if
incentives have increased domestic support for international cooperation, the
Ukrainian case has produced at least one promising sign.  Nunn-Lugar funds
have gone to support a joint venture which has converted a ship machinery and
equipment factory into one producing prefabricated housing units for
demobilized strategic rocket forces personnel.  Given the housing shortage there,
these units must be a welcome sight.67   
Another lesson to be learned from these two cases is that not only is
multilateralism necessary but it works.  The United States could not have
14
achieved the breakthroughs with North Korea or with Ukraine on a strictly
bilateral basis.  Each state involved in these negotiations had its own leverage to
move the process forward.  A welcome side-effect of the North Korean
negotiations was that it broadened the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance structure
beyond one concerned solely with deterrence to one strengthened by cooperative
economic and political elements.68  Significantly, the United States also had to
reach beyond its circle of allies for help;  recall the role played by China in the
North Korea negotiations.
In conclusion, incentives alter perceptions of national interest and provide
a systematic way to improve cooperation and communication without requiring
a change in the distribution of power between the parties.  Incentives can be
tailored to fit individual circumstances, i.e., they can be ad hoc arrangements,
arising independently of the existence of a regime or institution.  When skillfully
used, they do not threaten the recipient state or challenge its sovereignty.
Incentives increase the capability of states to communicate with each other and
to reach mutually beneficial outcomes, advancing the security interests of both
the donors and recipients.  While they may require long-term management,
incentives may offer the best option for achieving the long-term non-
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